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 The purpose of this note is to document discrepancies between certain of the 
findings reported in the preceding paper by Iqbal, Espenlaub and Strong, and the findings 
of the note’s authors using apparently similar data and methods. We were aware of the 
contents of the paper before its publication because one of us was a referee for the paper. 
 The results with which we are concerned are those for the long run average buy-
and-hold abnormal return (ABHAR) following the open offers, and the two-day average 
abnormal return (AAR) on their announcement. The discrepancies in relation to our 
published findings are as follows. First, Ngatuni, Capstaff and Marshall (2007) report 
statistically significant positive BHARs over five years following open offers during 
1991-95, whereas the BHARs in Iqbal et al over four years are negative and significant. 
Second, Armitage (2002) reports a significant positive announcement AAR of 1.99% for 
open offers during 1987-96, whereas the AAR in Iqbal et al is –1.10%, though it is not 
significant. We elaborate on these differences below.  
 Our puzzlement is with regard to the results derived from share returns. We have 
no reason to question the findings from accounting data regarding discretionary accruals 
around open offers. But if the estimates of the long and short run abnormal returns in the 
paper are not reliable, the results reported for the relationships between these variables 
and the discretionary current accruals (DCA) variable may likewise not be reliable.  
 
Long run abnormal returns 
 Iqbal et al. refer to Ngatuni et al. (2007)1 who examined the long term 
performance of UK firms making SEOs. The main focus of that study was a large sample 
                                                 
1 See footnote 10 in Iqbal et al. 
of rights issues made during the period 1986-1995, but they also examined a smaller 
sample of open offers. They used a BHAR methodology as follows. The BHAR on 
security j over the holding period τ to T is the difference between the actual and expected 
buy-and-hold returns (BHRs): 
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BHAR is the monthly BHR on the offer firm minus the expected BHR. The expected 
BHR is the return on a matched, non-issuing firm. The matched firms were chosen based 
on (a) size, (b) size and book-to-market ratio, and (c) size and industry.   
 The  average BHAR for N firms over the holding period was calculated as: 
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Ngatuni et al.’s (2007) sample covered open offers made during the period 1991-95, 
which is the same period examined by Iqbal et al. Ngatuni et al. reported a significant 
positive ABHAR in the 5-year period following open offer announcements. In contrast 
Iqbal et al. report significant negative abnormal returns in the 4-year post-offer period 
using a Fama-French 4-factor model, and a significant negative ABHAR over the 3-year 
post-offer period using a market portfolio benchmark. To validate their findings Iqbal et 
al. replicated the tests in Ngatuni et al. (2007) and found negative abnormal post-offer 
returns. They suggested that the contrasting results are most likely due to a survivorship 
bias in Ngatuni et al.’s (2007) analysis, where the offer firms were required to survive the 
full 5-year post-offer period but the matched firms were not.2 
                                                 
2 See footnote 10 in Iqbal et al. 
 Iqbal et al. are correct in pointing out this inconsistency in Ngatuni et al.’s (2007) 
framework of analysis, and it does have an impact on the results. The results are different 
when a requirement to survive the 5-year post-offer period is also imposed on the 
matched firms, but there is only limited evidence of negative performance. The revised 
results are summarised in Table 1. There are notable changes in the magnitude and 
significance of the findings and, to some extent, they are benchmark sensitive. But, in 
general, the abnormal returns tend to be positive rather than negative, particularly over 
the 5-year post-announcement period. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 In their paper Ngatuni et al. (2007) only reported the post-announcement 
ABHARs for open offers based on the size and book-to-market benchmark,3 so we 
concentrate on this revised result to begin with. Imposing the survival criterion on the 
size and book-to-market matched firms reduced the original sample in Ngatuni et al from 
132 to 112, as 20 of the matched firms did not survive the full 5-year period. The sample 
sizes in Iqbal et al. are not stated but they start at 176 in year 0 and decline with the 
holding period due to delistings. The non-surviving matches were not replaced to permit 
a more effective test of whether the positive findings in Ngatuni et al. (2007) were 
entirely driven by the 20 non-surviving matched firms. The revised results are all positive 
but no longer statistically significant, although still quite large for the 5-year period at 
39.78%. The result for the 1-year period is now small and positive at 4.51% as opposed 
                                                 
3 The unreported results using a size benchmark, and using a size and industry benchmark, were 
qualitatively similar but of lesser magnitude and significance. 
to small and negative in the original sample (−6.70%). The 3-year post-announcement 
returns are reduced from 15.60% to 8.80% (not statistically significant).4 
 As predicted by Iqbal et al. the survivorship bias in Ngatuni et al. (2007) led to a 
large overstatement of the positive returns in the 5-year post-offer period. Although the 
results for the size and book-to-market benchmark remain positive, they are now less 
emphatic. An examination of the detail of the results highlighted the potential for outliers 
to dominate the results. In a relatively small sample both survivorship bias and outliers 
can be distorting. A survivorship bias is likely to generate outliers but they can also occur 
from genuine observations. 
 The presence of outliers, even after removing the non-surviving matched firms, 
could account for the difference between the findings in Iqbal et al. and those in Ngatuni 
et al. We therefore checked the revised results for the impact of outliers. Figure 1 is a plot 
of the BHARs for the 112 offer firms over the 5-year period, using the size and book-to-
market benchmark. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 One notable outlier is +1391%, whilst there are three positives and two negatives 
around 1000%. The outliers here more or less cancel each other out but it is easy to 
envisage a situation in which the negatives or the positives dominate, and hence drive the 
average results. One method of checking for the undue influence of outliers is by 
trimming. For example, setting boundaries of + and −1000% gives an ABHAR of 
                                                 
4 The results reported in Ngatuni et al. (2007) for the 1-year and 3-year periods were also not statistically 
significant. 
+38.17% (N = 107) that is close to being statistically significant (p = 0.115). So the 
revised results for size and book-to-market do not appear to be driven by outliers. Iqbal et 
al. may wish to check whether there is any outlier dominance in their results.  
 Another possible source of the conflicting results lies in the choice of matched 
firms. Finding suitable matching firms can be problematical when combined with the 
requirement that matches did not raise new capital from share issues in the previous five 
years. The latter criterion rules out a substantial number of possible matches, and requires 
consideration of a wider range of firms. It may be that a matched firm strictly fits the 
criteria but has drifted sufficiently to cast doubt on its efficacy. This is more likely when 
a benchmark contains two criteria.  For example, when matching by size and industry the 
criterion is that the matched firm is in the same industry with the closest, but higher 
market value.5 The latter requirement occasionally means that the closest match has a 
much larger MV, which may undermine the validity of the match. There are other reasons 
why some researchers do not use an industry based criterion.6 Iqbal et al. avoided 
matching problems by using market return as a buy-and-hold benchmark for the results in 
their Table 5. However, they may wish to examine more closely the choice of the 
matched firms for all benchmarks in their replication of Ngatuni et al. (2007). 
 The adjusted Ngatuni et al. (2007) results for the size and industry benchmark are 
also shown in Table 1 above. The imposition of survival on matched firms reduced the 
sample to 112. The 5-year post-offer ABHAR is 24.75% but it is not statistically 
significant. There is a small positive ABHAR for the 3-year period, and a small negative 
ABHAR for the 1-year holding period, both statistically insignificant. Hence, there is no 
                                                 
5 This is the criterion used by Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995). They choose matched firms larger than 
the sample firms mainly because the size of the issuing firm size is expected to increase post-issue. 
6 See Loughran and Ritter  (1995) who argue against using an industry based criterion (pp. 27-28).   
evidence of long term negative performance using the size and industry benchmark, 
although there are small negative median ABHARs for the two shorter holding periods. 
 Finding suitable matching firms is less of a problem when a single criterion is 
used, and this was the case with matching by size only, but the results may be less 
compelling as fewer of the offer firms’ characteristics are captured. Size-matched 
ABHARs show evidence of negative abnormal returns over the 3-year period but not 
over the 5-year period. The sample in Ngatuni et al. (2007) is reduced to 119 when the 
survivorship criterion is imposed on size matched firms. The previous result for 3 years 
was positive but small at just under 10%, and it contained some large positive outliers 
linked with the non-surviving matched firms. In that particular case, therefore, the 
survivorship bias appears to have moved Ngatuni et al.’s (2007) results from positive to 
negative. The revised mean of −24.40% is statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
median of −33.70% is statistically significant at the 1% level, and therefore offers support 
to a finding of negative performance over a 3-year holding period. The 5-year positive 
finding is not driven by outliers. Trimming to within + or − 1000% gives a 5-year 
ABHAR of 19.22%, with only two observations removed. 
 In summary, the application of the same survival criterion to both offer firms and 
matched firms in the Ngatuni et al. (2007) sample changes the scale and significance of 
the findings. However, following the adjustment, there is only limited evidence of 
negative post-announcement abnormal returns. The ABHARs are all positive for the 5-
year holding period, and positive for two out of three benchmarks for the 3-year holding 
period, although they are not statistically significant.7 Taking account of Iqbal et al.’s 
                                                 
7 There remains a clear distinction between performance following rights issues and performance following 
open offers as emphasised in Ngatuni et al. (2007). 
important point on survivorship bias has moved Ngatuni et al.’s findings closer to the 
findings of Iqbal et al., but a discrepancy remains. It may simply be due to difference in 
the samples. The re-examination of Ngatuni et al. (2007) also led to deliberation of the 
possible problems posed by outliers, and the possible distorting effects of unsuitable 
matched firms. These concerns need to be explicitly recognised in research using 
relatively small samples, and should feature in the discussion of the associated results. 
 
Event study 
 Iqbal et al. report an AAR for the day before the announcement plus the 
announcement day of –1.10%, which is not statistically significant (presumably at the 
10% level or better). Their starting sample is all 286 open offers by UK listed industrial 
firms during 1991-95 recorded in the FT Extel Record of Takeovers, Offers and New 
Issues. From this sample they subtract 28 offers of less than £1m, 32 repeat offers and 94 
offers for which there was insufficient accounting data in Datastream, leaving a final 
sample of 132 open offers. Their method of calculating the abnormal return for share j on 
day t, ARjt, is the index model, ie 
 ARj,t = Rj,t  –  RM,t (3) 
where Rj,t is the return for share j and RM,t is the return on a market index, in this case the 
FTSE All-Share Index. To enable daily returns to be summed, each return will be 
calculated as 
 Rj,t = ln(Pj,t/Pj,t–1) (4)  
where Pj,t is the share price at the close of day t. Their source for both accounting and 
share price data is Datastream. 
 We use the abnormal returns calculated for Armitage (2002) to check the AAR of 
–1.10%. His source for both prospectuses and share data was Primark Extel, which no 
longer exists. His database contains 318 open offers with share price data for the years 
1991-95. He calculated abnormal returns using two methods. One is the familiar market 
model: 
 ARj,t = Rj,t  –  (αj + β jRM,t) (5) 
where the alpha and beta coefficients were estimated via OLS regression using daily 
returns and an estimation period of 180 days, and the index used was the FTSE All-
Share, as in Iqbal et al. The second method was introduced by Eckbo and Masulis (1992); 
the results reported in Armitage (2002) are from this method. For each offer a regression 
was run using daily data and dummy variables to distinguish sub-periods of interest: 
 Rj,t  = αj  +  β jRM,t  +  γ1,jD1,t  +  γ2,jD2,t  +  γ3,jD3,t  +  γ4,jD4,t  +  ej,t (6) 
where D1,t = one for event days –1 to 0, and zero otherwise, day 0 being the 
announcement day. The other dummy variables picked out subsequent sub-periods, with 
which we are not concerned here. The combined estimation and event period was from 
85 days before the announcement to 100 days after the offer close. The coefficient γ1,j is a 
measure of the abnormal return for each day of the announcement sub-period, so the two-
day announcement abnormal return is 2γ1,j. 
 The results for 1991-95 using Armitage’s data are reported in Table 2. The AAR 
for the full sample of 318 open offers is 1.55% (from the market model; the results from 
the Eckbo-Masulis method are very similar). In an attempt to replicate the sample of 
Iqbal et al., the following were excluded: offers of less than £1m; offers by issuers that 
made more than one open offer during the sample period; and offers by issuers that could 
not be found in Datastream as at July 2007 or did not have accounting data in Datastream 
for the year in which the offer took place. This resulted in a sample of 129, which is close 
in size and, we trust, in composition to the sample of 132 studied by Iqbal et al. The AAR 
for our replicating sample is 2.91%. Thus, the exclusions to try to replicate the sample in 
Iqbal et al. result in an increase in the AAR using Armitage’s data and an increase to 4.04 
percentage points in the difference between the AAR of Iqbal et al. and the AAR reported 
here. The distribution of the abnormal returns is somewhat skewed to the right, as the 
median is 1.52%. But the AAR of 2.91% is not due to outliers; it is 2.83% excluding the 
two highest and two lowest abnormal returns, and 2.53% excluding the four abnormal 
returns with an absolute value in excess of 20%.  
 Some of the observations in the forgoing samples should, arguably, be excluded 
because of problems with the data, as discussed in Armitage (2002, p. 1258). In 
particular, (i) some shares make offers during periods in which their shares have been 
suspended from trading, and Extel continues to show a (constant) price for the share; (ii) 
Extel does not always make an adjustment for the share’s going ex-rights; and (iii) 
sometimes it was not possible to check for (i) and (ii). Removing the observations with 
problems (i), (ii) or (iii) results in small increases in the AARs for the full sample and the 
replicating sample. 
 In their discussion of previous event studies on UK seasoned equity offers, Iqbal 
et al. infer that the reaction to private placings is likely to be more positive than the 
reaction to open offers. Our sample of 238 open offers with unproblematic price data 
contains 36 offers that were accompanied by a pure private placing (the shares in an open 
offer are ‘placed with clawback’, ie placed and also offered pro rata to existing 
shareholders, whereas there is no clawback in a pure private placing). But excluding the 
open offers accompanied by a placing increases the sample AAR, so the presence of open 
offers companied by a pure placing does not account for the positive AARs in our 
samples. 
 The method of calculating the test statistic for significance makes a big difference 
to its numerical value, though in this case not to our conclusions. Many event studies, 
including Armitage (2002), report a test statistic based on standardised abnormal returns 
(SARs). For the market model, the abnormal return for each share is standardised by 
dividing it by the standard error of the market model regression for the relevant share, 
and then a test statistic is calculated from the average of the SARs: 
 t1MM = √N[av(SARj)]/√T (7) 
where N is the number of offers in the sample and T is the number of days over which the 
SAR is accumulated. The standardisation has the effect that shares with more volatile 
returns are given less weight in arriving at the test statistic. For the Eckbo-Masulis 
method, 
 tEM = √N[av(γj/sγj)] (8) 
where sγj is the standard error of the γj coefficient for share j (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992, p. 
319).  
 An alternative for the market and index models is to calculate a conventional t-
statistic for the mean of a sample. In our case the sample consists of the two-day 
abnormal returns, so 
 t2MM = √N(AAR)/stdev(ARj) (9) 
where stdev(ARj) is the standard deviation of the sample of two-day abnormal returns. It 
is striking that the test statistics based on SARs are several times larger than the 
conventional t-statistics. SARs can not be calculated using the index model, so (9) is 
probably the test statistic used by Iqbal et al. The AAR for the sample of 129 offers 
closest to that of Iqbal et al is significantly greater than 0 at the 1% level, according to the 
statistics in (7), (8) and (9). Since the AAR in Iqbal. et al is negative, the difference in the 
AARs between the two studies is almost certainly highly statistically significant. 
 The substantial difference in the AARs is perplexing. The samples should not 
differ much. The studies use different methods of calculating abnormal returns, but this is 
extremely unlikely to account for a difference in the AAR of 4.04 percentage points for a 
two-day event window. Brown and Warner (1985), for example, find via simulation that 
the market and index models produce very similar results for event windows of one day 
and eleven days. The sources of the price data differ. One possibility is that Datastream’s 
‘adjusted prices’ (code P) are not adjusted for the impact of the discount in open offers 
before the shares go ex-entitlement, which is usually on the announcement day in open 
offers. Most of the prices in Extel were adjusted in this way. If Datastream’s prices are 
not adjusted, a lower announcement AAR would be expected from Datastream data than 
from Extel data. Alternatively, or in addition, there may be differences in the data due to 
errors in either database. Ince and Porter (2006) compare Centre for Research in 
Securities Prices and Datastream US share price data and report, inter alia, that ‘the 
closing prices used by each source often do not agree’ (p. 472). Screens for errors alter 
results substantially, for example for the mean monthly returns of size-ranked portfolios. 
Conclusion 
 Our checks have confirmed the initial impression of materially different results 
across the studies for both long and short run average abnormal returns, though the 
difference has narrowed in the case of the long run returns. We have discussed some 
possible explanations but remain uncertain as to why the results differ. 
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Figure 1:    5-year post-announcement BHARs, size & book-to-
market adjusted
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Table 1 
Average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (ABHARs) following open offers in the 
UK during 1991-95: adjusted results from Ngatuni et al. (2007) 
 
The table reports ABHARs calculated as the average of  the buy-and-hold returns of 
offer firms minus the buy-and-hold returns of matched firms. Firms are matched by 
size, by size and book-to-market ratio, and by size and industry. ABHARs are 
calculated for the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post-offer holding periods. The sample is 
from Ngatuni et al. (2007) but has been reduced following the removal of matched 
firms that do not survive the full 5-year period. 
Matching by Mean [median] ABHAR % 
 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Size (n=119)   −1.73 
[4.05] 
−24.40* 
−[33.70]*** 
18.13 
[−14.66] 
Size and book-to-market (n=112) 4.51 
[3.31] 
8.80 
[0.46] 
39.78 
[13.81] 
Size and industry (n=112) −1.38 
[−1.65] 
2.60 
[−7.80] 
24.75 
[3.70] 
***statistically significant at the 1% level (t-test) 
    *statistically significant at the 10% level (Wilcoxon signed rank sum test) 
 
 
Table 2 
Event study for open offers made between 1 January 1991 and 31 December 1995 
 
The table reports the average abnormal return (AAR) for the day before the announcement plus the announcement day, using 
abnormal returns calculated for Armitage (2002). The market model AAR is given by equation (5) in the text and the two test 
statistics, t1MM and t2MM, are given by (5) and (7). The Eckbo-Masulis AAR and its test statistic are given by equations (7) and (8) 
respectively. 
 
 Market   Eckbo- 
 model   Masulis 
 AAR t1MM t2M AAR tEM N 
 
Full sample 1.55% 19.18 1.89 1.65% 17.34 318  
Excluding problem data 1.77% 19.11 2.51 1.95% 16.32 238 
Excluding problem data and offers with placings 2.30% 19.91 3.46 2.50% 16.86 202 
Replication of Iqbal et al  2.91% 17.64 4.66 2.83% 13.39 129 
Replication excluding problem data 3.14% 17.98 4.49 3.13% 13.59 87  
